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Abstract
Making learners robust to adversarial perturbation at test time (i.e., evasion attacks) or training time
(i.e., poisoning attacks) has emerged as a challenging task. It is known that for some natural settings,
sublinear perturbations in the training phase or the testing phase can drastically decrease the quality of
the predictions. These negative results, however, are information theoretic and only prove the existence
of such successful adversarial perturbations. A natural question for these settings is whether or not we
can make classifiers computationally robust to polynomial-time attacks.
In this work, we prove strong barriers against achieving such envisioned computational robustness
both for evasion and poisoning attacks. In particular, we show that if the test instances come from a
product distribution (e.g., uniform over {0, 1}n or [0, 1]n, or isotropic n-variate Gaussian) and that there
is an initial constant error, then there exists a polynomial-time attack that finds adversarial examples
of Hamming distance O(
√
n). For poisoning attacks, we prove that for any learning algorithm with
sample complexity m and any efficiently computable “predicate” defining some “bad” property B for
the produced hypothesis (e.g., failing on a particular test) that happenswith an initial constant probability,
there exist polynomial-time online poisoning attacks that tamper with O(
√
m) many examples, replace
them with other correctly labeled examples, and increases the probability of the bad event B to ≈ 1.
Both of our poisoning and evasion attacks are black-box in how they access their corresponding
components of the system (i.e., the hypothesis, the concept, and the learning algorithm) and make no
further assumptions about the classifier or the learning algorithm producing the classifier.
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1 Introduction
Making trained classifiers robust to adversarial attacks of various forms has been an active line of research
in machine learning recently. Two major forms of attack are the so called “evasion” and “poisoning” at-
tacks. In an evasion attack, an adversary enters the game during the test phase and tries to perturb the
original test instance x into a “close” adversarial instance x′ that is misclassified by the produced hypoth-
esis (a.k.a. trained model) h. In a poisoning attack, the adversary manipulates the training data into a
“closely related” poisoned version with the goal of increasing the risk (or some other closely related prop-
erty such as failing on a particular example) of the hypothesis h produced based on the poisoned data.
Starting with Szegedy et al. [SZS+14] a race has emerged between evasion attacks that aim to find classi-
fied adversarial examples and defences against those attacks [BCM+13,BFR14,GSS15, PMW+16,CW17,
XEQ17, ACW18]. In another line of work, many papers studied poisoning attacks and defense mecha-
nisms against them [BNL12,ABL17,XBB+15,PMSW16,RNH+09,SHN+18,KL17,BL17,CSV17,DKS17,
MDM18,DKS18a,DKK+18b,PSBR18,DKS18b,DKK+17,DKK+18a]. Although, some specific problems
(e.g., that of image classification) naturally has got more attention in this line of work, like other works in
the theory literature, we approach the robustness problem from a general and fundamental perspective.
Is adversarially robust classification possible? Recently, started by Gilmer et el. [GMF+18] and fol-
lowed by [FFF18, DMM18, SHS+18, MDM19], it was shown that for many natural metric probability
spaces of instances (e.g., uniform distribution over {0, 1}n, [0, 1]n, unit n-sphere, or isotropic Gaussian
in dimension n, all with “normalized” Euclidean or Hamming distance) adversarial examples of sublinear
perturbations exist for almost all test instances. Indeed, as shown by Mahloujifar, Diochnos, and Mah-
moody [MDM19], if the instances are drawn from any “normal Le´vy family” [MS86] of metric probability
spaces (that include all the above-mentioned examples), and if there exists an initial non-negligible risk for
the generated hypothesis classifier h, an adversary can perturb an initial instance x into an adversarial one
x′ that is only ≈ √n-far (which is sublinear in n) from x and that x′ is misclassified.
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In the context of poisoning attacks, some classic results about malicious noise [Val85, KL93, BEK02]
could be interpreted as limitations of learning under poisoning. On the positive side, the recent break-
throughs of Diakonikolas et al. [DKK+16] and Lia et al. [LRV16] showed the surprising power of robust
inference over poisoned data in polynomial-time with error that does not depend on the dimension of the in-
stances. These works led to an active line of work (e.g., see [CSV17,DKS17,DKS18a,DKK+18b,PSBR18,
DKS18b]) exploring the possibility of robust statistics over poisoned data with algorithmic guarantees. In
particular [CSV17,DKS18a] showed how to perform list-docodable learning; outputting a set of hypothesis
one of which is of high quality, and [DKK+18b,PSBR18] studied robust stochastic convex optimization.
Studying the power of poisoning attacks, the work of Mahloujifar et al. [MDM19] demonstrated the
power of poisoning attacks of various forms as long as there is a “small but non-negligible vulnerability” in
no attack setting. Namely, assuming that the goal of the adversary is to increase the probability of any “bad
event” B over the generated hypothesis, it was proved in [MDM19] that the adversary can always increase
the probability of B from any non-negligible (or at least sub-exponentially large) probability to ≈ 1 using
sublinear perturbations of the training data. In particular, the adversary can decrease the confidence of the
produced hypothesis (to have error at most ε for a fixed ε), or alternatively it can increase the classification
error of a particular instance x, using an adversarial poisoning strategy that achieves these goals by changing
≈ √m of the training examples, wherem is the sample complexity of the learner.
Is computationally robust classification possible? All the above-mentioned sublinear-perturbation at-
tacks of [FFF18, DMM18, SHS+18, MDM19], in both evasion and poisoning models, were information
theoretic (i.e., existential). Namely, they only show the existence of such adversarial instances for evasion
attacks or that they show the existence of such adversarial poisoned data with sublinear perturbations for
poisoning attacks. In this work, we study the next natural question; can we overcome these information
theoretic (existential) lower bounds by relying on the fact that the adversary is computationally bounded?
Namely, can we design solutions that resist polynomial-time attacks on the robustness of the learning algo-
rithms? More specifically, the general question studied in our work is as follows.
Can we make classifiers robust to computationally bounded adversarial perturbations (of sub-
linear magnitude) that occur during the training or the test phase?
In this work we focus on sublinear perturbations as our main results are negative (i.e., demonstrating the
power of sublinear tampering).1
1.1 Our Results
In this work, we prove strong barriers against basing the robustness of classifiers, in both evasion and
poisoning settings, on computational intractability. Namely, we show that in many natural settings (i.e., any
problem for which the instances are drawn from a product distribution and that their distances are measured
by Hamming distance) adversarial examples could be found in polynomial time. This result applies to any
learning task over these distributions. In the poisoning attacks’ setting, we show that for any learning task
and any distribution over the labeled instances, if the goal of the adversary is to decrease the confidence
of the learner or to increase its error on any particular instance x, it can always do so in polynomial time
by only changing ≈ √m of the labeled instances and replacing them with yet correctly labeled examples.
Below we describe both of these results at a high level.
1For any result proved on the positive side, e.g., it would be stronger to resist even a linear amount of perturbations.
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Theorem 1.1 (Informal: polynomial-time evasion attacks). Let P be a classification problem in which the
test instances are drawn from a product distribution x ≡ u1 × · · · × un. Suppose c is a concept function
(i.e., ground truth) and h is a hypothesis that has a constant Ω(1) error in predicting c. Then, there is a
polynomial-time (black-box) adversary that perturbs only≈ O(√n) of the blocks of the instances and make
them misclassified with probability ≈ 1.
(See Theorem 3.3 for the formal version of the following theorem.)
The above theorem covers many natural distributions such as uniform distributions over {0, 1}n or [0, 1]n
or the isotropic Gaussian of dimension n, so long as the distance measure is Hamming distance. Also, as
we will see in Theorem 3.3, the initial error necessary for our polynomial-time evasion attack could be as
small as 1/poly(log n) to keep the perturbations O˜(
√
n), and even initial error ω(log n/
√
n) is enough to
keep the perturbations sublinear o(n). Finally, by “black-box” we mean that our attacker only needs oracle
access to the hypothesis h, the ground truth c, and distribution x.2 This black-box condition is similar to
the one defined in previous work of Papernot et al. [PMG+17], however the notion of black box in some
other works (e.g., see [IEAL18]) are more relaxed and give some additional data, such as a vector containing
probabilities assigned to each label, to the adversary as well.
We also note that, even though learning is usually done with respect to a family of distributions (e.g., all
distributions), working with a particular distribution in our negative results make them indeed stronger.
We now describe our main result about polynomial-time poisoning attacks. See Theorem 3.6 for the
formal version of the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal: polynomial-time poisoning attacks). Let P be a classification problem with a
deterministic learner L that is given m labeled examples of the form (x, c(x)) for a concept function c
(determining the ground truth).
• Decreasing confidence. For any risk threshold ε ∈ [0, 1], let ρ be the probability that L produces a
hypothesis of risk at most ε, referred to as the ε-confidence of L. If ρ is at most 1− Ω(1), then there
is a polynomial-time adversary that replaces at most ≈ O(√m) of the training examples with other
correctly classified examples and makes the ε-confidence go down to any constant O(1) ≈ 0.
• Increasing chosen-instance3 error. For any fixed test instance x, if the average error of the hypothe-
ses generated by L over instance x is at least Ω(1), then there is a polynomial-time adversary that
replaces at most ≈ O(√m) of the training examples with other correctly classified examples and
increases this average error to any constant ≈ 1.
Moreover, both attacks above are online and black-box.
Generalization to arbitrary predicates. More generally, and similarly to the information theoretic at-
tacks of [MDM19], the two parts of Theorem 1.2 follow as special cases of a more general result, in which
the adversary has a particular efficiently checkable predicate in mind defined over the hypothesis (e.g., mis-
labelling on a particular x or having more than ε risk). We show that the adversary can significantly increase
the probability of this bad event if it originally happens with any (arbitrary small) constant probability.
Our negative results do not contradict the recent successful line of work started by [DKK+16,LRV16],
as in our setting, we start with an initial required error in the no-attack scenario and show that any such
seemingly benign vulnerability (of say probability 1/1000) can be significantly amplified.
2As mentioned, we need to give our adversary oracle access to a sampler for the instance distribution x as well, though this
distribution is usually polynomial-time samplable.
3Poisoning attacks in which the instance is chosen are also called targeted [BNS+06].
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Other features of our poisoning attacks. Similarly to the previous attacks of Mahloujifar et al. [MM17,
MDM19,MMM18], both poisoning attacks of Theorem 1.2 have the following features.
1. Our attacks are online; i.e., during the attack, the adversary is only aware of the training examples
sampled so far when it decides about the next tampering decision. So, these attacks can be launched
against online learners in a way that the tampering happens concurrently with the learning process (see
[WC18] for an in-depth study of attacks against online learners). The information theoretic attacks
of [MDM19] were “off-line” as the adversary needed the full training sequence before attacking.
2. Our attacks only use correct labels for instances that they inject to the training set (see [SHN+18]
where attacks of this form are studied in practice).
3. Our attacks are black-box [PMG+17], as they use the learning algorithm L and concept c as oracles.
Further related work. Computational constraints for robust learning were previously considered by the
works of Mahloujifar et al. [MM17,MDM18] for poisoning attacks and Bubeck et al. [BPR18] for adversar-
ial examples (i.e., evasion attacks). The works of [MM17,MDM18] studied so called “p-tampering” attacks
that are online poisoning attacks in which each incoming training example could become tamperable with
independent probability p and even in that case the adversary can substitute them with other correctly la-
beled examples. (The independent probabilities of tampering makes p-tampering attacks a special form of
Valiant’s malicious noise model [Val85].) The works of [MM17,MDM18] showed that for an initial con-
stant error µ, polynomial-time p-tampering attacks can decrease the confidence of the learner or alternatively
increase a chosen instance’s error by Ω(µ · p). Therefore, in order to increase the (chosen instance) error to
50%, their attacks needed to tamper with a linear number of training examples. The more recent work of
Mahloujifar et al. [MDM19] improved this attack to use only a sublinear
√
m number of tamperings at the
cost of only achieving information theoretic (exponential time) attacks. In this work, we get the best of both
worlds, i.e., polynomial-time poisoning attacks of sublinear tampering budget.
The recent work of Bubeck, Price, and Razenshteyn [BPR18] studied whether the difficulty of finding
robust classifiers is due to information theoretic barriers or that it is due to computational constraints. Indeed,
they showed that (for a broad range of problems with minimal conditions) if we assume the existence
of robust classifiers then polynomially many samples would contain enough information for guiding the
learners towards one of those robust classifiers, even though as shown by Schmidt at al. [SST+18] this
could be provably a larger sample complexity than the setting with no attacks. However, [BPR18] showed
that finding such classifier might not be efficiently feasible, where efficiency here is enforced by Kearns’
statistical query (SQ) model [Kea98]. So, even though our work and the work of [BPR18] both study
computational constraints, the work of [BPR18] studied barriers against efficiently finding robust classifiers,
while we study whether or not robust classifiers exist at all in the presence of computationally efficient
attackers. In fact, in [DKS17] similar computational barriers were proved against achieving robustness in
the poisoning attacks in the SQ model (i.e., information-theoretic optimal accuracy cannot be achieved by
an efficient learning SQ algorithm). However, as mentioned, in this work we are focusing on the efficiency
of the attacker and ask whether or not such computational limitation could be leveraged for robust learning.
Other related definitions of adversarial examples. In both of our results (for poisoning and evasion
attacks), we use definitions that require misclassification of the test instance as the main goal of the adver-
sary. However, other definitions of adversarial examples are proposed in the literature that coincide with this
definition under natural conditions for practical problems of study (such as image classification).
Corrupted inputs. Feige, Mansour, and Schapire [FMS15] (and follow-up works of [FMS18,AKM18])
studied learning and inference in the presence of corrupted inputs. In this setting, the adversary can corrupt
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the test instance x to another instance x′ chosen from “a few” possible corrupted versions, and then the
classifier’s job is to predict the label of the original uncorrected instance x by getting x′ as input.4 Inspired
by robust optimization [BTEGN09], the more recent works of Madry et al. [MMS+18] and Schmidt et
al. [SST+18] studied adversarial loss (and risk) for corrupted inputs in metric spaces. (One major difference
is that now the number of possible corrupted inputs could be huge.)
Prediction change. Some other works (e.g., [SZS+14, FFF18]) only compare the prediction of the hy-
pothesis over the adversarial example with its own prediction on the honest example (and so their definition
is independent of the ground truth c). Even though in many natural settings these definitions become very
close, in order to prover our formal theorems we use a definition that is based on the “error region” of the hy-
pothesis in comparison with the ground truth that is implicit in [GMF+18,BPR18] and in [MM17,MDM18]
in the context of poisoning attacks. We refer the reader to the work of Diochnos, Mahloujifar, and Mah-
moody [DMM18] for a taxonomy of these variants and further discussion.
1.2 Technique: Computational Concentration of Measure in Product Spaces
In order to prove our Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, we make use of ideas developed in a recent beautiful work
of Kalai, Komargodski and Raz. [KKR18] in the context of attacking coin tossing protocols. In a nutshell,
our proofs proceed by first designing new polynomial-time coin-tossing attacks by first carefully changing
the model of [KKR18], and then we show how such coin tossing attacks can be used to obtain evasion
and poisoning attacks. Our new coin tossing attacks could be interpreted as polynomial-time algorithmic
proofs for concentration of measure in product distributions under Hamming distance. We can then use such
algorithmic proofs instead of the information theoretic concentration results used in [MDM19].
To describe our techniques, it is instructive to first recall the big picture of the polynomial-time poisoning
attacks of [MM17,MDM19], even though they needed linear perturbations, before describing how those
ideas can be extended to obtain stronger attacks with sublinear perturbations in both evasion and poisoning
contexts. Indeed, the core idea there is to model the task of the adversary by a Boolean function f(u) over
the training data u = (u1, . . . , um), and roughly speaking define f(u) = 1 if the training process over u
leads to a misclassification by the hypothesis (on a chosen instance) or “low confidence” over the produced
hypothesis. Then, they showed how to increase the expected value of any such f from an initial constant
value µ to µ′ ≈ µ+ p by tampering with p fraction of “blocks” of the input sequence (u1, . . . , um).
The more recent work of [MDM19] improved the bounds achieved by the above poisoning attacks by
using an computationally unbounded attack who is more efficient in its tampering budget and only tampers
with a sublinear ≈ √m number of them training examples and yet increase the average of f from µ = Ω(1)
to µ′ ≈ 1. The key idea used in [MDM19] was to use the concentration of measure in product probability
spaces under the Hamming distance [AM80,MS86,McD89,Tal95]. Namely, it is known that for any product
space of dimension m (here, modeling the training sequence that is iid sampled) and any initial set S of
constant probability (here, S = {u | f(u) = 1}, “almost all” of the points in the product space are of
distance ≤ O(√m) from S , and so the measure is concentrated around S .
Computational concentration of measure. In a concentrated spaces (e.g., in normal Le´vy families) of
dimension n, for any sufficiently large set S (of, say constant measure) the “typical” minimum distance
of the space points to S is sublinear o(n) (O(√n) in normal Le´vy families). A computational version of
this statement shall find such “close” points in S in polynomial time. The main technical contribution of
4The work of [MRT15] also studied robust inference, but with static corruption in which the adversary chooses its corruption
before seeing the test instance.
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our work is to prove such computational concentration of measure for any product distribution under the
Hamming distance. Namely, we prove the following result about biasing Boolean functions defined over
product spaces using polynomial time tampering algorithms. (See Theorem 3.1 for a formal variant.)
Theorem 1.3 (Informal: computational concentration of products). Let u ≡ u1 × . . .un be any product
distribution of dimension n and let f : Supp(u) 7→ {0, 1} be any Boolean function with expected value
E[f(u)] = Ω(1). Then, there is a polynomial-time tampering adversary who only tampers with O(
√
n) of
the blocks of a sample u← u and increases the average of f over the tampered distribution to ≈ 1.
Once we prove Theorem 1.3, we can also use it directly to obtain evasion attacks that find adversarial
examples, so long as the test instances are drawn from a product distribution and that the distances over the
instances are measured by Hamming distance. Indeed, using concentration results (or their stronger forms
of isoperimetric inequalities) was the key method used in previous works of [GMF+18, FFF18, DMM18,
SHS+18,MDM19] to show the existence of adversarial examples. Thus, our Theorem 3.1 is a natural tool
to be used in this context as well, as it simply shows that similar (yet not exactly equal) bounds to those
proved by the concentration of measure can be achieved algorithmically using polynomial time adversaries.
Relation to approximate nearest neighbor search. We note that computational concentration of measure
(e.g., as proved in Theorems 1.3 and 3.1 for product spaces under Hamming distance) bears similarities to
the problem of “approximate nearest neighbor” (ANN) search problem [IM98,AI06,AR15,AIR18] in high
dimension. Indeed, in the ANN search problem, we are given a set of points P ⊆ X where X is the support
set of a metric probability space (of high dimension). We then want to answer approximate near neighbor
queries quickly. Namely, for a given x ∈ X , in case there is a point y ∈ P where x and y are “close”, the
algorithm should return a point y′ that is comparably close to x. Despite similarities, (algorithmic proofs
of) computational concentration of measure are different in two regards: (1) In our case the set P could
be huge, so it is not even possible to be given as input, but we rather have implicit access to P (e.g., by
oracle access). (2) We are not necessarily looking for point by point approximate solutions; we only need
the average distance of the returned points in P to be within some (nontrivial) asymptotic bounds.
1.2.1 Ideas behind the Proof of Theorem 1.3
The proof of our Theorem 3.1 is inspired by the recent work of Kalai et al. [KKR18] in the context of
attacks against coin tossing protocols. Indeed, [KKR18] proved that in any coin tossing protocol in which n
parties send a single message each, there is always an adversary who can corrupt up to ≈ √n of the players
adaptively and almost fix the output to 0 or 1, making progress towards resolving a conjecture of Ben-Or
and Linial [BOL89].
At first sight, it might seem that we should be able to directly use the result of [KKR18] for our purposes
of proving Theorem 1.3, as they design adversaries who tamper with ≈ O(√n) blocks of an incoming input
and change the average of a Boolean function defined over them (i.e., the coin toss). However, there are two
major obstacles against such approach. (1) The attack of [KKR18] is exponential time (as it is recursively
defined over the full tree of the values of the input random process), and (2) their attack can not always
increase the probability of a function f defined over the input, and it can only guarantee that either we will
increase this average or decrease it. In fact (2) is necessary for the result of [KKR18], as in their model the
adversary has to pick the tampered blocks before seeing their contents, and that there are simple functions
for which we cannot choose the direction of the bias arbitrarily. Both of these restrictions are acceptable in
the context of [KKR18], but not for our setting: here we want to increase the average of f as it represents
the “error” in the learning process, and we want polynomial time biasing attacks.
7
Interestingly, the work of [KKR18] also presented an alternative simpler proof for a previously known
result of Lichtenstein et al. [LLS89] in the context of adaptive corruption in coin tossing attacks. In that
special case, the messages sent by parties only consist of single bits. In the simpler bit-wise setting, it is
indeed possible to achieve biasing attacks that always increase the average of the output function bit. Thus,
there is hope that such attacks could be adapted to our setting, and this is exactly what we do.
To prove Theorem 3.1, we do proceed as follows.
1. We give a new block-wise biasing attack, inspired by the bit-wise attack of [KKR18], that also always
increases the average of the final output bit. (This is not possible for block-wise model of [KKR18].)
2. We show that this attack can be approximate in polynomial time. (The block-wise attack of [KKR18]
seems inherently exponential time).
3. We use ideas from the bit-wise attack of [KKR18] to analyze our block-wise attack. To do this, new
subtleties arise that can be handled by using stronger forms of Azuma’s inequality (see Lemma 4.1)
as opposed to the “basic” version of this inequality used by [KKR18] for their bit-wise attack.
Here, we describe our new attack in a simplified ideal setting in which we ignore computational effi-
ciency. We will then compare it with the attack of [KKR18]. The attack has the form that can be adapted to
computationally efficient setting by approximating the partial averages needed for the attack. See Construc-
tions 4.3 and 4.14 for the formal description of the attack in computational settings.
Construction 1.4 (Informal: biasing attack over product distributions). Let u ≡ u1 × . . .un be a product
distribution. Our (ideal model) tampering attacker IdTam is parameterized by τ . Given a sequence of blocks
(u1, . . . , un), IdTam tampers with them by reading them one by one (starting from u1) and decides about
the tampered values inductively as follows. Suppose v1, . . . , vi−1 are the finalized values for the first i− 1
blocks (after tampering decisions).
• Tampering case 1. If there is some value vi ∈ Supp(ui) such that by picking it, the average of f
goes up by at least τ for the fixed prefix (v1, . . . , vi−1) and for a random continuation of the rest of
the blocks, then pick vi as the tampered value for the i
th block.
• Tampering case 2. Otherwise, if the actual (untampered) content of the ith block, namely ui, de-
creases the average of f (under a random continuation of the remaining blocks) for the fixed prefix
(v1, . . . , vi−1), then ignore the original block ui, and pick some tampered value vi ∈ Supp(ui) that vi
at least does not decrease the average. (Such vi always exists by an elementary averaging argument.)
• Not tampering. If none of the above cases happen, output the original sample vi = ui.
By picking parameter τ ≈ 1/√n, we prove that the attack achieves the desired properties of Theo-
rem 3.1; Namely, the number of tampered blocks is ≈ O(1/τ), while the bias of f under attack is ≈ 1.
The bit-wise attack of [KKR18] can be seen as simpler variant of the attack above in which the adversary
(also) has access to an oracle that returns the partial averages for random continuation. Namely, in their
attack tampering cases 1 and 2 are combined into one: if the next bit can increase (or equivalently, can
decrease) the partial averages of the current prefix by τ , then the adversary chooses to corrupt that bit (even
without seeing its actual content). The crucial difference between the bit-wise attack of [KKR18] and our
block-wise attack of Theorem 1.3 is in tampering case 2. Here we do look at the untampered value of the
ith block, and doing so is necessary for getting an attack in block-wise setting that biases f(·) towards +1.
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Extension to general product distributions and for coin-tossing protocols. Our proof of Theorem 1.3,
and its formalized version Theorem 3.1, with almost no changes extend to any joint distributions like u ≡
(u1, . . . ,un) under a proper definition of online tampering in which the next “untampered” block is sampled
conditioned on the previously tampered blocks chosen by the adversary. This shows that in any n round
coin tossing protocol in which each of the n parties sends exactly one message, there is a polynomial-time
strong adaptive adversary who corrupts O(
√
n) of the parties and biases the output to be 1 with 99/100
probability. A strong adaptive adversary, introduced by Goldwasser et al. [GKP15], allows the adversary to
see the messages before they are delivered and then corrupt a party (and change their message) based on
their initial messages that were about to be sent. Our result improves a previous result of [GKP15] that was
proved for one-round protocols using exponential time attackers. Our attack extends to arbitrary (up to) n
round protocols and is also polynomial time. Our results are incomparable to those of [KKR18]; while they
also corrupt up toO(
√
n) of the messages, attackers do not see the messages of the parties before corrupting
them, but our attackers inherently rely on this information. On the other hand, their bias is either towards 0
or toward 1 (for the block-wise setting) while our attacks can choose the direction of the biasing.
2 Preliminaries
General notation. We use calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) for sets. By u ← u we denote sampling u from
the probability distribution u. For a randomized algorithm R(·), by y ← R(x) we denote the randomized
execution ofR on input x outputting y. By u ≡ vwe denote that the random variables u and v have the same
distributions. Unless stated otherwise, by using a bar over a variable u, we emphasize that it is a vector. By
u ≡ (u1,u2, . . . ,un)we refer to a joint distribution over vectors with n components. For a joint distribution
u ≡ (u1, . . . ,un), we use u≤i to denote the joint distribution of the first i variables u ≡ (u1, . . . ,ui). Also,
for a vector u = (u1 . . . un) we use u≤i to denote the prefix (u1, . . . , ui). For a joint distribution (u,v), by
(u | v) we denote the conditional distribution (u | v = v). By Supp(u) = {u | Pr[u = u] > 0} we denote
the support set of u. By Tu(·) we denote an algorithm T (·) with oracle access to a sampler for distribution
u that upon every query returns a fresh sample from u. By u × v we refer to the product distribution in
which u and v are sampled independently. By un we denote the n-fold product u with itself returning n iid
samples. Multiple instances of a random variable x in the same statement (e.g., (x, c(x)) refer to the same
sample. By PPT we denote “probabilistic polynomial time”.
Notation for classification problems. A classification problem (X ,Y,x, C,H) is specified by the follow-
ing components. The set X is the set of possible instances, Y is the set of possible labels, x is a distribution
over X , C is a class of concept functions where c ∈ C is always a mapping from X to Y . Even though
in a learning problem, we usually work with a family of distributions (e.g., all distributions over X ) here
we work with only one distribution x. The reason is that our results are impossibility results, and proving
limits of learning under a known distribution x are indeed stronger results. We did not state the loss function
explicitly, as we work with classification problems. For x ∈ X , c ∈ C, the risk or error of a hypothe-
sis h ∈ H is equal to Risk(h, c) = Prx←x[h(x) 6= c(x)]. We are usually interested in learning problems
(X ,Y,x, C,H) with a specific metric d defined over X for the purpose of defining risk and robustness under
instance perturbations controlled by metric d. Then, we simply write (X ,Y,x, C,H, d) to include d.
The following definition based on the definitions given in [MM17,MDM18,MDM19].
Definition 2.1 (Confidence, chosen-instance error, and their adversarial variants). Let L be a learning algo-
rithm for a classification problem P = (X ,Y,x, C,H), m be the sample complexity of L, and c ∈ C be any
concept. We define the (adversarial) confidence function and chosen-instance error as follows.
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• Confidence function. For any error function ε = ε(m), the adversarial confidence in the presence of
a adversary A is defined as
ConfA(m, c, ε) = Pr
u←(x,c(x))m
h←L(A(u))
[Risk(h, c) < ε].
By Conf(·) we denote the confidence without any attack; namely, Conf(·) = ConfI(·) for the trivial
(identity function) adversary I that does not change the training data.
• Chosen-instance error. For a fixed test instance x ∈ X , the chosen-instance error (over instance x)
in presence of a poisoning adversary A is defined as
ErrA(m, c, x) = Pr
u←(x,c(x))m
h←L(A(u))
[h(x) 6= c(x)].
By Err(·) we denote the chosen-instance error (over x) without any attacks; namely, Err(·) = ErrI(·)
for the trivial (identity function) adversary I .
2.1 Basic Definitions for Tampering Algorithms
Our tampering adversaries follow a close model to that of p-budget adversaries defined in [MDM18]. Such
adversaries, given a sequence of blocks, select at most p fraction of the locations in the sequence and change
their value. The p-budget model of [MDM18] works in an online setting in which, the adversary should
decide for the ith block, only knowing the first i− 1 blocks. In this work, we define both online and offline
attacks that work in a closely related budget model in which we only bound the expected number of tampered
blocks. We find this notion more natural for the robustness of learners.
Definition 2.2 (Online and offline tampering). We define the following two tampering attack models.
• Online attacks. Let u ≡ u1 × · · · × un be an arbitrary product distribution.5 We call a (potentially
randomized and computationally unbounded) algorithm OnTam an online tampering algorithm for u,
if given any i ∈ [n] and any u≤i ∈ Supp(u1)× · · · × Supp(ui), it holds that
Pr
vi←OnTam(u≤i)
[vi ∈ Supp(ui)] = 1 .
Namely, OnTam(u≤i) outputs (a candidate i
th block) vi in the support set of ui.
6
• Offline attacks. For an arbitrary joint distribution u ≡ (u1 . . . ,un) (that might or might not be
a product distribution), we call a (potentially randomized and possibly computationally unbounded)
algorithm OffTam an offline tampering algorithm for u, if given any u ∈ Supp(u), it holds that
Pr
v←OnTam(u)
[v ∈ Supp(u)] = 1 .
Namely, given any u← u, OnTam(u) always outputs a vector in Supp(u).
5We restrict the case of online attacks to product distribution as they will have simpler notations and that they cover our main
applications, however they can be generalized to arbitrary joint distributions as well with a bit more care.
6Looking ahead, this restriction makes our attacks stronger in the case of poisoning attacks by always picking correct lables
during the attack.
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• Efficiency of attacks. If u is a joint distribution coming from a family of distributions (perhaps based
on the index n ∈ N ), we call an online or offline tampering algorithm efficient, if its running time is
poly(N) where N is the total bit length of any u ∈ Supp(u).
• Notation for tampered distributions. For any joint distribution u, any u← u, and for any tampering
algorithm Tam, by 〈u ‖Tam〉 we refer to the distribution obtained by running Tam over u, and by
〈u ‖Tam〉 we refer to the final distribution by also sampling u← u at random. More formally,
– For an offline tampering algorithm OffTam, the distribution 〈u ‖OffTam〉 is sampled by simply
running OffTam on the whole u and obtaining the output (v1, . . . , vn)← OffTam(u1, . . . , un).
– For an online tampering algorithm OnTam and input u = (u1, . . . , un) sampled from a product
distribution u1 × . . .un, we obtain the output (v1, . . . , vn) ← 〈u ‖OnTam〉 inductively: for
i ∈ [i], sample vi ← OnTam(v1, . . . , vi−1, ui).7
• Average budget of tampering attacks. Suppose d is a metric defined over Supp(u). We say an
online or offline tampering algorithm Tam has average budget (at most) b, if
E
u←u,
v←〈u ‖Tam〉
[d(u, v)] ≤ b.
If no metric d is specified, we use Hamming distance over vectors of dimension n.
3 Polynomial-time Attacks from Computational Concentration of Products
In this section, we will first formally state our main technical tool, Theorem 3.1, that underlies our polynomial-
time evasion and poisoning attacks. Namely, we will prove that product distributions are “computationally
concentrated” under the Hamming distance, in the sense that any subset with constant probability, is “com-
putationally close” to most of the points in the probability space. We will then use this tool to obtain our
attacks against learners. We will finally prove our main technical tool.
Theorem 3.1 (Computational concentration of product distributions). Let u ≡ u1 × · · · × un be any
product distribution and f : Supp(u) 7→ {0, 1} be any Boolean function over u, and let µ = E[f(u)] be
the expected value of f . Then, for any ρ where µ < ρ < 1, there is an online tampering algorithm OnTam
generating the tampering distribution v ≡ 〈u ‖OnTam〉 with the following properties.
1. Achieved bias. E[f(v)] ≥ ρ.
2. Efficiency. Having oracle access to f and a sampler for u, OnTam = OnTamf,u runs in time
poly
(
n·ℓ
µ·(1−ρ)
)
where ℓ is the maximum bit length of any ui ∈ Supp(ui) for any i ∈ [n].
3. Average budget. OnTam = OnTamf,u uses average budget (2/µ) ·
√
n · ln(2/(1 − ρ)) .
In the rest of this section, we will use Theorem 3.1 to prove limitations of robust learning in the presence
of polynomial-time poisoning and evasion attackers. We will prove Theorem 3.1 in the next section.
7By limiting our online attackers to product distributions, we can sample the whole sequence of “untampered” values
(u1, . . . , un) at the beginning; otherwise, for general random processes in which the distribution of blocks are correlated, we
would need to sample (u1, . . . , un) and (v1, . . . , vn) jointly by sampling ui conditioned on v1, . . . , vi−1.
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Range of initial and target error covered by Theorem 3.1. For any (1 − ρ) = 1/poly(n), µ =
O(1/polylog n) Theorem 3.1 uses an average budget of only O˜(
√
n). If we start from larger initial er-
ror that is still bounded by µ = o(1/
√
n), the average budget given by the attacker of Theorem 3.1 will still
be o(n), which is nontrivial as it is still sublinear in the dimension. However, if we start from µ = Ω(1/
√
n),
we the attacker of Theorem 3.1 stops to give a nontrivial bound, as the required linear Ω(n) budget is enough
for getting any target error trivially. In contrast, the information theoretic attacks of [MDM19] can handle
much smaller initial error all the way to subexponentially small µ. Finding the maximum range of µ for
which computationally bounded attackers can increase the error to 1− 1/poly(n) remains open.
3.1 Polynomial-time Evasion Attacks
The following definition of robustness against adversarial perturbations of the input is based on the previous
definitions used in [GMF+18, BPR18,DMM18,MDM19] in which the adversary aims at misclassification
of the adversarially perturbed instance by trying to push them into the error region.
We define the following definition for a fixed distribution x (as our negative results are for simplicity
stated for such cases) but a direct generalization can be obtained for any family of distributions over the
instances. Moreover, we only give a definition for the “black-box” type of attacks (again because our attacks
are black-box) but a more general definition can be given for non-black-box attacks as well.
Definition 3.2 (Computational (error-region) evasion robustness). Let P = (X ,Y,x, C,H, d) be a classi-
fication problem. Suppose the components of P are indexed by n ∈ N, and let 0 < µ(n) < ρ(n) ≤ 1 for
functions µ(n) and ρ(n) that for simplicity we denote by µ and ρ. We say that the µ-to-ρ evasion robustness
of P is at most b = b(n), if there is a (perhaps computationally unbounded) tampering oracle algorithm A(·)
such that for all h ∈ H, c ∈ C with error region E = E(h, c),Pr[x ∈ E ] ≥ µ, we have the following.
1. Having oracle access to h, c and a sampler for x, the oracle adversary A = Ah,c,x(x) reaches adver-
sarial risk to at least ρ (for the choice of c, h). Namely, Prx←x[A
h,c,x(x) ∈ E ] ≥ ρ.
2. The average budget of the adversary A = Ah,c,x (with oracle access to h, c and a sampler for x) is at
most b for samples x← x and with respect to metric d.
The µ-to-ρ computational evasion robustness of P is at most b = b(n), if the same statement holds for an
efficient (i.e., PPT) oracle algorithm A.
Evasion robustness of problems vs. that of learners. Computational evasion robustness as defined in
Definition 3.2 directly deals with learning problems regardless of what learning algorithm is used for them.
The reason for such a choice is that in this work, we prove negative results demonstrating the limitations
of computational robustness. Therefore, limiting the robustness of a learning problems regardless of their
learner is a stronger result. In particular, any negative result (i.e., showing attackers with small tampering
budget) about µ-to-ρ (computational) robustness of a learning problem P, immediately implies that any
learning algorithm L for P that produces hypothesis with risk ≈ µ can always be attacked (efficiently) to
reach adversarial risk ρ.
Now we state and prove our main theorem about evasion attacks. Note that the proof of this theorem is
identical to the reduction shown in [MDM19]. The difference is that, instead of using original concentration
inequalities, we use our new results about computational concentration of product measures under hamming
distance and obtain attacks that work in polynomial time.
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Theorem 3.3 (Limits on computational evasion robustness). Let P = (X ,Y,x, C,H, d) be a classification
problem in which the instances’ distribution x ≡ u1×· · ·×un is a product distribution of dimension n and
d is the Hamming distance over vectors of dimension n. Let 0 < µ = µ(n) < ρ = ρ(n) ≤ 1 be functions of
n. Then, the µ-to-ρ computational evasion robustness of P is at most
b = (2/µ) ·
√
n · ln(2/(1 − ρ)).
In particular, if µ(n) = ω(log n/
√
n) and ρ(n) = 1 − 1/poly(n), then b = o(n) is sublinear in n, and if
µ(n) = Ω(1/polylog(n)) and ρ(n) = 1− 1/poly(n), then b = O˜(√n).
Proof. We first define a Boolean function f : : X → [0, 1] as follows:
f(x) =
{
1 c(x) 6= h(x),
0 c(x) = h(x).
It is clear that E[f(x)] = Pr[x ∈ E ] ≥ µ. Therefore, by using Theorem 3.1, we know there is an tampering
algorithm Af,xµ that runs in time poly(n·ℓ/µ·(1−ρ)) and increases the average of f to ρwhile using average
budget at most (2/µ) ·√n · ln(2/(1 − ρ)). Note that A needs oracle access to f(·) which is computable by
oracle access to h(·) and c(·).
Remark 3.4 (Computationally bounded prediction-change evasion attacks). As we mentioned in the in-
troduction, some works studying adversarial examples (e.g., [SZS+14, FFF18]) study robustness by only
comparing the prediction of the hypothesis over the adversarial example with its own prediction on the hon-
est example, and so their definition is independent of the ground truth c. (In the terminology of [DMM18],
such attacks are called prediction-change attacks.) Here we point out that our biasing attack of Theo-
rem 3.1 can be used to prove limits on the robustness against such evasion attacks as well. In particular,
in [MDM19], it was shown that using concentration of measure, one can obtain existential (information
theoretic) prediction-change attacks (even of the “targeted” form in which the target label is selected). By
combining the arguments of [MDM19] and plugging in our computationally bounded attack of Theorem 3.1
one can obtain impossibility results for basing the robustness of hypotheses on computational hardness.
3.2 Polynomial-time Poisoning Attacks
The following definition formalizes the notion of robustness against computationally bounded poisoning
adversaries. Our definition is based on those of [MM17,MDM18] who studied online poisoning attacks and
that of [MDM19] who studied offline poisoning attacks.
Definition 3.5 (Computational poisoning robustness). Let P = (X ,Y,x, C,H) be a classification problem
with a learner L of sample complexity m. Let 0 < µ = µ(m) < ρ = ρ(m) ≤ 1 be functions ofm.
• Computational confidence robustness. For ε = ε(m), we say that the ρ-to-µ ε-confidence ro-
bustness of the learner L is at most b = b(m), if there is a (computationally unbounded) tampering
algorithm A such that for all c ∈ C for which Conf(m, c, ε) ≤ ρ, the following two conditions hold.
1. The average budget of A = AL,c,x (who has oracle access to L, c and a sampler for x) tampering
with the distribution (x, c(x))m is at most b.
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2. The adversarial confidence for ε′ = 99 · ε/100 is at most ConfA(m, c, ε′) ≤ µ when attacked
by the oracle adversary A = AL,c,x.8
The ρ-to-µ computational ε-confidence robustness of the learner L is at most b = b(n), if the same
statement holds for an efficient (i.e., PPT) oracle algorithm A .
• Computational chosen-instance robustness. For an instance x← x, we say that the µ-to-ρ chosen-
instance robustness of the learner L for x is at most b = b(m), if there is a (computationally un-
bounded) tampering oracle algorithm A (that could depend on x) such that for all c ∈ C for which
E(m, c, x) ≥ µ, the following two conditions hold.
1. The average budget of A = AL,c,x (who has oracle access to L, c and a sampler for x) tampering
with the distribution (x, c(x))m is at most b.
2. Adversary A = AL,c,x increases the chosen-instance error to ErrA(m, c, x) ≥ ρ.
The µ-to-ρ computational chosen-instance robustness of the learner L for instance x is at most b =
b(n), if the same thing holds for an efficient (i.e., PPT) oracle algorithm A.
Now we state and prove our main theorem about poisoning attacks. Again, the proof of this theorem
is identical to the reduction from shown in [MDM19]. The difference is that here we use our new results
about computational concentration of product measures under hamming distance and get attacks that work
in polynomial time. Another difference is that our attacks here are online due the online nature of our
martingale attacks on product measures.
Theorem 3.6 (Limits on computational poisoning robustness). Let P = (X ,Y,x, C,H) be a classification
problem with a deterministic polynomial-time learner L. Let 0 < µ = µ(m) < ρ = ρ(m) ≤ 1 be functions
ofm, wherem is the sample complexity of L.
• Confidence robustness. Let ε = ε(m) ≥ 1/poly(m) be the risk threshold defining the confidence
function. Then, the ρ-to-µ computational ε-confidence robustness of the learner L is at most b =
(2/(1 − ρ)) ·√m · ln(2/µ).
• Chosen-instance robustness. For any instance x ← x, the µ-to-ρ computational chosen-instance
robustness of the learner L for x is at most b = (2/µ) ·
√
m · ln(2/(1 − ρ)).
In particular, in both cases above if µ(m) = ω(logm/
√
m) and ρ(m) = 1−1/poly(m), then b = o(m)
is sublinear inm, and if µ(m) = Ω(1/poly(logm)) and ρ(m) = 1− 1/poly(m), then b = O˜(√m).
Moreover, the polynomial time attacker A bounding the computational poisoning robustness in both
cases above has the following features: (1) A is online, and (2) A is plausible; namely, it never uses any
wrong labels in its poisoned training data.
Proof. We first prove the case of chosen-instance robustness. We define a Boolean function f : Xm → [0, 1]
as follows:
f1(x1, . . . , xm) =
{
1 h = L((x1, c(x1)), . . . , (xn, c(xm)) ∧ h(x) 6= c(x),
0 h = L((x1, c(x1)), . . . , (xn, c(xm)) ∧ h(x) = c(x).
8The computationally-unbounded variant of this definition as used in [MDM19] uses ε′ = ε instead of ε′ = 99 · ε/100, but as
observed by [MDM18], due to the computational bounded nature of our attack we need to have a small gap between ε′ and ε.
14
It is clear that E[f1(x
m)] = E(m, c, x) ≥ µ. Therefore, by using Theorem 3.1, we know there is a PPT
tampering Algorithm A
f1(·),µ
2 that runs in time poly(m · ℓ/(µ · (1− ρ))), and increase the average of f1 to ρ
while using average budget at most (2/µ) ·
√
m · ln(2/(1 − ρ)). Note that A1 needs oracle access to f1(·)
which is computable by oracle access to the learning algorithm L(·) and concept c(·). Now we prove the
case of confidence robustness. Again we define a Boolean function f2 : Xm → [0, 1] as follows:
f2(x1, . . . , xm) =
{
1 h = L((x1, c(x1)), . . . , (xn, c(xm)) ∧ Pr[h(x) 6= c(x)] ≥ ε,
0 h = L((x1, c(x1)), . . . , (xn, c(xm)) ∧ Pr[h(x) 6= c(x)] < ε.
We have E[f2(x
m)] = 1 − Conf(m, c, ε) ≥ 1 − ρ. Therefore, by using Theorem 3.1, we know there is a
PPT tampering Algorithm A
f2(·),µ
2 that runs in time poly(m · ℓ/(1 − ρ) · µ), and increase the average of f2
to 1− µ while using average budget at most (2/(1 − ρ)) ·√m · ln(2/µ). Note that A2 needs oracle access
to f2(·), which requires the adversary to know the exact error of a hypothesis. Computing the exact error is
not possible in polynomial time but using an emprical estimator, the adversary can find an approximation of
the error which is sufficient for the attack (See Corollary 3 of [MDM18]).
4 Products are Computationally Concentrated under Hamming Distance
In this section, we formally prove Theorem 3.1. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove the following
theorem for product distributions u ≡ un over the same u, but the same proof directly holds for more
general case of u ≡ u1 × . . .un.
We will first present an attack in an idealized model in which the adversary has access to some promised
oracles that approximate certain properties of the function f in a carefully defined way. In this first step,
we indeed show that our attack (and its proof) are robust to such approximations. We then show that these
promised oracles can be obtained with high probability, and by doing so we obtain the final polynomial time
biasing attack proving the concentration of product distributions under Hamming distance.
4.1 Biasing Attack Using Promised Approximate Oracles
We first state a usefull lemma that is similar to Azuma inequality but works with approximate martingales.
Lemma 4.1 (Azuma’s inequality for approximate conditions). Let t ≡ (t1, . . . , tn) be a sequence of n
jointly distributed random variables such that for all i ∈ [n], Pr[|ti| > τ ] ≤ γ and for all t≤i−1 ← t≤i−1,
we have E[ti | t≤i−1] ≥ −γ. Then, we have
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
ti ≤ −s
]
≤ e
−(s−n·γ)2
2n·(τ+γ)2 + n · γ
Proof. If we let γ = 0, Lemma 4.1 becomes the standard version of Azuma inequality. Here we sketch
why Lemma 4.1 can also be reduced to the case that γ = 0 (i.e., Azuma inequality). We build a sequence
t
′
i from ti as follows: Sample ti ← ti | t′≤i−1, if |ti + γ| ≤ τ + γ, output t′i = ti + γ. Otherwise output
0. We clearly have E[t′i | t′≤i−1] ≥ 0 and Pr[|t′i| ≥ τ + γ] = 0. Now we can use Lemma 4.1 for the
basic case of γ = 0 for the sequence t′i and use it to get a looser bound for sequence ti, using the fact that
∃i ∈ [n], |ti| ≥ τ happens with probability at most n · γ.
Now we define some oracle functions that our tampering attack is based on.
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Definition 4.2 (Notation for oracles). Suppose f : Supp(u) 7→ R is defined over a product distribution
u ≡ u1 × · · · × un of dimension n. Then, given a specific parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] we define the following
promise oracles for any i ∈ [n] and any u≤i ∈ Supp(u≤i). Namely, our promise oracles could be one out
of any oracles that satisfy the following guarantees.
• Oracle a(u≤i) returns the average gain conditioned on the given prefix:
a(u≤i) = E
(ui+1,...,un)←ui+1×···×un
[f(u1, . . . , un)].
• Oracle g(u≤i) returns the gain on the average in the last block and is defined as
g(u≤i) = a(u≤i)− a(u≤i−1).
• Oracle g˜(·) approximates the gain of average in the last block, |g˜(u≤i)− g(u≤i)| ≤ γ.
• Oracle g˜∗(·) returns the approximate maximum gain with two promised properties:
[Property A:] Pr
ui←u
[
g(u≤i) > g˜
∗(u≤i−1) + 2γ
]
< γ,
[Property B:] g˜∗(u≤i−1) ≥ −2γ.
• Oracle h˜(·) returns a sample producing the approximate maximum gain g˜∗(·). Namely,
g˜∗(u≤i−1) = g˜(u≤i−1, h˜(u≤i−1)).
Following is the construction of our tampering attack based on the oracles defined above.
Construction 4.3 (Attack using promised approximate oracles). For a product distribution u ≡ un and
τ ∈ [0, 1], our (online) efficient tampering attacker AppTam(τ,γ) is parameterized by τ, γ ∈ [0, 1], but
for simplicity it will be denoted as AppTam. The parameter γ determines the approximation promised by
the oracles used by AppTam. Given (v1, . . . , vi−1, ui) ∈ Supp(u)i as input, AppTam will output some
vi ∈ Supp(u). Let wi = h˜(v≤i−1) as defined in Definition 4.2. AppTam chooses its output vi as follows.
• Tampering. If g˜∗(v≤i−1) ≥ τ or if g˜(v≤i−1, ui) ≤ −τ , then output vi = wi.
• Not tampering. Otherwise, output the original sample vi = ui.
Before proving the bounds, we first define some events based on the conditions/cases that happen during
the tampering attack of Construction 4.3.
Definition 4.4. We define the following three Boolean functions over ∪ni=1 Supp(u)i based on the actions
taken by the tampering algorithm of Construction 4.3. Namely, for any (v≤i−1, ui) ∈ Supp(u)i, we define
C1(v≤i−1) =
{
1 if g˜∗(v≤i−1) ≥ τ ,
0 otherwise;
C2(v≤i−1, ui) =
{
1 if C1(v≤i−1) = 0 ∧ g˜(v≤i−1, ui) ≤ −τ ,
0 otherwise;
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C3(v≤i−1, ui) =
{
1 if C1(v≤i−1) = 0 and C2(v≤i−1, ui) = 0,
0 otherwise.
Thus, if C1 or C2 happens, it means that the adversary has chosen to tamper with block i, and if C3
happens it means that the adversary has not chosen to tamper with block i. Also, since the above func-
tions are Boolean, we might treat them as events as well. Moreover, for convenience we define the set
C1 =
{
v≤i | i ∈ [n− 1], v≤i ∈ Supp(u)i ∧ C1(v≤i)
}
.
The following Claim bounds the average of the function when the attack of Construction 4.3 is performed
on the distribution.
Claim 4.5. If v ≡ 〈un ‖AppTam〉 is the tampering distribution of the efficient attacker AppTam of Con-
struction 4.3, then it holds that
E[f(v)] ≥ 1− e
−(µ−2n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 − n · γ.
Proof. Define a function t as follows,
t(v≤i−1, ui) =
{
0 if C1(v≤i−1) or C2(v≤i−1, ui),
g˜(v≤i−1, ui) if C3(v≤i−1, ui).
Now consider a sequence of random variables t = (t1, . . . , tn) sampled as follows. We first sample u← u,
then v ← 〈u ‖AppTam〉, and then ti = t(v≤i−1, ui) for i ∈ [n]. Now, for any t≤i−1 ← t≤i−1, we claim
that E[ti | t≤i−1] ≥ 0. The reason is as follows.
E[ti | t≤i−1] = E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1|t≤i−1
[
E
ui←u
[g˜(v≤i−1, ui) · C3(v≤i−1, ui)]
]
≥ E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1|t≤i−1
[
E
ui←u
[g˜(v≤i−1, ui) · (C3 (v≤i−1, ui) ∨ C2 (v≤i−1, ui))]
]
= E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1|t≤i−1
[
E
ui←u
[g˜(v≤i−1, ui) · (1− C1 (v≤i−1))]
]
= E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1|t≤i−1
[
(1− C1 (v≤i−1)) · E
ui←u
[g˜(v≤i−1, ui)]
]
≥ E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1|t≤i−1
[
(1− C1 (v≤i−1)) · E
ui←u
[g(v≤i−1, ui)− γ]
]
≥ −γ.
Moreover, for any t≤i−1 ∈ [Supp(t≤i−1)] we have
Pr
ti←ti|t≤i−1
[|ti| ≥ τ + 3γ] = Pr
v≤i←v≤i|t≤i−1
[|g˜(v≤i)| ≥ τ + 3γ ∧ C3(v≤i)]
= Pr
v≤i←v≤i|t≤i−1
[g˜(v≤i) ≥ τ + 3γ ∧ C3(v≤i)]
≤ Pr
v≤i←v≤i|t≤i−1
[g˜(v≤i) ≥ τ + 3γ ∧ C1(v≤i)]
= Pr
v≤i←v≤i|t≤i−1
[g˜(v≤i) ≥ τ + 3γ ∧ g˜∗(v≤i−1) ≤ τ ]
≤ Pr
v≤i←v≤i|t≤i−1
[g(v≤i) ≥ τ + 2γ ∧ g˜∗(v≤i−1) ≤ τ ]
≤ γ.
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Therefore, the sequence t = (t1, . . . , tn), computed over the same v ← v, satisfies the properties required
in Lemma 4.1. (Let τ of that Lemma 4.1 to be τ+3γ here, and and letting s of that lemma to be−µ+2n·γ.)
This way, we get
Pr
[ n∑
i=1
ti ≤ −µ+ 2n · γ
]
≤ e
−(µ−3nγ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 + n · γ .
On the other hand, for every v ∈ Supp(v) we have
f(v) = µ+
n∑
i=1
g(v≤i)
≥ µ+
n∑
i=1
(g˜(v≤i)− γ)
= µ− n · γ +
n∑
i=1
(C1 (v≤i−1) + C3 (v≤i)) · g˜(v≤i)
≥ µ− n · γ +
n∑
i=1
ti −
n∑
i=1
C1(v≤i−1) · γ
≥ µ− 2n · γ +
n∑
i=1
ti.
Therefore, we have
Pr[f(v) = 0] ≤ Pr
[ n∑
i=1
ti ≤ −µ+ 2n · γ
]
≤ e
−(µ−3n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 + n · γ.
Now we state and prove another Claim which bounds the expected number of tamperings performed by
the attack of Construction 4.3
Claim 4.6. For a tampering sequence v ← 〈u ‖AppTam〉, let Ti = C1(v≤i−1) ∨ C2(v≤i−1, ui) be the
event (or equivalently the Boolean function) denoting that a tampering choice is made by the adversary of
Construction 4.3 over the i’th block. If T =
∑n
i=1 Ti denotes the total number of tamperings, then
E[T] ≤ 1− µ+ n · γ
τ − 2γ .
Proof. For any v≤i−1 ∈ C1, we have
E
vi←vi|v≤i−1
[g(v≤i)] ≥ g˜∗(v≤i−1)− γ ≥ τ − γ = (τ − γ) · Pr
ui←u
[C1(v≤i−1) ∨ C2(v≤i−1, ui)], (1)
18
and, for any v≤i−1 6∈ C1 we have
E
vi←vi|v≤i−1
[g(v≤i)] ≥ E
vi←vi|v≤i−1
[g˜(v≤i)− γ]
= E
ui←u
[(1− C2(v≤i−1, ui)) · g˜(v≤i−1, ui) + C2(v≤i−1, ui) · g˜∗(v≤i−1)]− γ
≥ E
ui←u
[(1− C2(v≤i−1, ui)) · g˜(v≤i−1, ui) + C2(v≤i−1, ui) · (g˜(v≤i−1, ui) + τ − 2γ)]
= E
ui←u
[g˜(v≤i−1, ui) + C2(v≤i−1, ui) · (τ − 2γ)]
≥ −γ + E
ui←u
[C2(v≤i−1, ui) · (τ − 2γ)]
= (τ − 2γ) · Pr
ui←u
[C2(v≤i−1, ui)]− γ
= (τ − 2γ) · Pr
ui←u
[C1(v≤i−1) ∨ C2(v≤i−1, ui)]− γ. (2)
By Equations 1 and 2, for any v≤i−1 ∈ Supp(u)i−1 we have
E
vi←vi|v≤i−1
[g(v≤i)] ≥ (τ − 2γ) · Pr
ui←u
[C1(v≤i−1) ∨ C2(v≤i−1, ui)]− γ. (3)
Also, let PT(v≤i−1) be the probability of tampering in the ith block conditioned on the prefix v≤i−1.
Namely,
PT(v≤i−1) = Pr
ui←u
[C1(v≤i−1) ∨ C2(v≤i−1, ui)].
The definition of PT(v≤i−1) together with Equation 3 implies that
E
vi←vi|v≤i−1
[g(v≤i)] ≥ (τ − 2γ) · PT(v≤i−1)− γ. (4)
We now obtain that
E [f(v)]− µ = E
[
n∑
i=1
g(v≤i)
]
(by linearity of expectation) =
n∑
i=1
E [g(v≤i)]
=
n∑
i=1
E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1
[
E
vi←vi|v≤i−1
[g(v≤i)]
]
(by Equation 4) ≥ (τ − 2γ) ·
n∑
i=1
E
v≤i−1←v≤i−1
[PT(v≤i−1)]− nγ
(by linearity of expectation) = (τ − 2γ) · E
[
n∑
i=1
PT(v≤i−1)
]
− nγ
≥ (τ − 2γ) · E[T]− nγ.
Therefore, we have
E[T] ≤ 1− µ+ n · γ
τ − 2 · γ .
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4.2 Polynomial-time Biasing Attack Using Probably Approximate Oracles
In this subsection, we finally prove Theorem 3.1 by getting rid of the promised approximate oracles, and
having them approximated by the attacker itself, though only with high probability. We will also show how
to pick the parameters of the attack to achieve the bounds claimed in Theorem 3.1.
We start by sketching the intuitive fact that the approximate oracles of Definition 4.2 could indeed be
provided to our polynomial time attacker of Construction 4.3 with high probability by repeated sampling
and applying Chernoff bound.
Construction 4.7 (Oracle g˜(·)). Given a prefix v≤i ∈ Supp(u)i, let
k = −12 · ln(γ/2) + ln(ln(1 + γ))− ln(− ln(γ/2))
γ2
.
Sample k random continuations w11, . . . , w
k
1 from u
n−i−1 and k continuations w12, . . . , w
k
2 from u
n−i. Let
a˜(v≤i) =
1
k
·
(
f(v≤i, w
1
1) + · · ·+ f(v≤i, wk1)
)
a˜(v≤i−1) =
1
k
·
(
f(v≤i−1, w
1
2) + · · ·+ f(v≤i−1, wk2)
)
and output g˜(v≤i) = a˜(v≤i)− a˜(v≤i−1).
Claim 4.8. For the oracle g˜(·) of Construction 4.7 We have
Pr[|g˜(y≤i)− g(y≤i)| ≥ γ] ≤ −γ · ln(1 + γ)
2 · ln(γ/2) ≤
γ
2
.
Proof. Define independent Boolean random variables f11 , . . . , f
k
1 and f
1
2 , . . . , f
k
2 such that for each j ∈ [k]we
have f
j
1 ≡ f(v≤i,un−i) and f j2 ≡ f(v≤i−1,un−i+1). Also let a(y≤i) = E[f(v≤i,un−i)] and a(y≤i−1) =
E[f(v≤i−1,u
n−i+1)]. By Chenroff inequality we have,
Pr
[∣∣1
k
·
∑
j∈k
f
j
1 − a(y≤i)
∣∣ ≥ γ
2
]
= Pr
[
|a˜(y≤i)− a(y≤i)| ≥ γ
2
]
≤ e−k·γ
2
12 . (5)
On the other hand, again by Chenroff we have,
Pr
[∣∣1
k
·
∑
j∈k
f
j
2 − a(y≤i)
∣∣ ≥ γ
2
]
= Pr
[∣∣a˜(y≤i−1)− a(y≤i−1)∣∣ ≥ γ
2
]
≤ e−k·γ
2
12 . (6)
Now by Inequalities 5 and 6, we have
Pr
[|g˜(y≤i)− g(y≤i)| ≥ γ] ≤ 2 · e−k·γ212 = −γ · ln(1 + γ)
2 · ln(γ/2) .
Note that
− ln(1+γ)
ln(γ/2) is less than 1 for γ ∈ [0, 1].Therefore, we have,
Pr
[|g˜(y≤i)− g(y≤i)| ≥ γ] ≤ γ
2
.
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Claim 4.9. The implementation of the oracle of Construction 4.7 runs in time O(n · ℓ/γ3).
Proof. The oracle samples
k = −12 · ln(γ/2) + ln(ln(1 + γ))− ln(− ln(γ/2))
γ2
≤ 24
γ3
continuations. Therefore, the running time is O(n · ℓ/γ3).
Construction 4.10 (Oracles g˜∗(·) and h˜(·)). Given a prefix v≤i−1 ∈ Supp(u)i−1, sample k = − ln(γ/2)ln(1+γ)
blocks u1, . . . , uk from u. Now let
h˜(v≤i−1) = argmax
uj
g˜∗(v≤i−1, u
j) and g˜∗(v≤i−1) = max
uj
g˜(v≤i−1, u
j).
Claim 4.11. Let λ ∈ [−1, 1] be such that Pr [g(y≤i−1,u) ≥ λ] ≥ γ. For the g˜∗(·) oracle of Construc-
tion 4.10 We have
Pr [g˜∗(y≤i−1) ≤ λ− γ] ≤ γ.
Proof. We first bound the probability of all the actual gains being less then λ. We have
Pr[∀j ∈ [k], g(v≤i−1, uj) ≤ λ] = Pr[g(v≤i−1,u) ≤ −γ]k ≤ (1− γ)k ≤ γ
2
.
Now, consider the following event
B =
{
0 if for all j ∈ k we have |g˜(v≤i−1, uj)− g(v≤i−1, uj)| ≤ γ,
1 otherwise.
By Claim 4.8 and a union bound we have Pr[B] ≤ k · −γ·ln(1+γ)2·ln(γ) = γ2 . Therefore, we have
Pr[∀j ∈ [k], g˜(v≤i−1, uj) ≤ λ− γ] ≤ Pr[∀j ∈ [k], g(v≤i−1, vj) ≤ λ] + γ
2
≤ γ.
Claim 4.12. For the oracle g˜∗(·) of Construction 4.10, we have Pr[g˜∗(y≤i−1) ≤ −2γ] ≤ γ.
Proof. We first bound the probability of all the actual gains being less then −γ. We have
Pr[∀j ∈ [k], g(v≤i−1, uj) ≤ −γ] = Pr[g(v≤i−1,u) ≤ −γ]k ≤
(
1
1 + γ
)k
=
γ
2
.
Now consider the following event
B =
{
0 if for all j ∈ k we have |g˜(v≤i−1, uj)− g(v≤i−1, uj)| ≤ γ,
1 otherwise.
By Claim 4.8 and a union bound, we have Pr[B] ≤ k · −γ·ln(1+γ)ln(γ/2) = γ2 . Therefore, we have
Pr[∀j ∈ [k], g˜(v≤i−1, uj) ≤ −2γ] ≤ Pr[∀j ∈ [k], g(v≤i−1, uj) ≤ −γ] + γ
2
≤ γ.
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Claim 4.13. The Oracles of Construction 4.10 run in time O(n · ℓ/γ5).
Proof. The oracles generate
k = − ln(γ/2)
ln(1 + γ)
≤ 1
γ2
samples and for each sample call the oracle g˜(·) of Construction 4.7. Therefore, by Claim 4.9 the running
time of the Oracles of Construction 4.10 are O(n · ℓ/γ5)
Now we show that using the approximate oracles of Constructions 4.7 and 4.10 we still can achieve the
desired bounds.
Construction 4.14 (Attack using probably approximate oracles). Given input vector (v1, . . . , vi−1, ui) ∈
Supp(u)i, AppTam will output some vi ∈ Supp(u). Let wi = h˜(v≤i−1) as defined in Definition 4.2. Now,
EffTam chooses its output vi as follows.
• Tampering. If g˜∗(v≤i−1) ≥ τ or if g˜(v≤i−1, ui) ≤ −τ , then output vi = wi.
• Not tampering. Otherwise, output the original sample vi = ui.
where g˜∗(·),h˜(·) and g˜(·) oracles are instantiated using Constructions 4.10 and 4.7.
The following claim bounds the average of function in presence of the attack of Construction 4.14.
Claim 4.15. If v ≡ 〈un ‖EffTam〉 is the tampering distribution of the efficient attacker EffTam of Con-
struction 4.3, then it holds that
E[f(v)] ≥ 1− e
−(µ−2n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 − 4n · γ.
Proof. Let B be the event that for at least one of the queries of Construction 4.14, the promises are not
satisfied. Namely,
B = ∃ i, Pr
ui←u
[
g(v≤i−1, ui) > g˜
∗(v≤i−1) + 2γ
] ≤ γ
∨ g˜∗(u≤i−1) < −2γ
∨ |g˜(v≤i−1, ui)− g(v≤i−1, ui)| ≥ γ.
During the whole course of process of Construction 4.14, there are exactly n, g˜∗(·) queries and exactly g˜(·)
queries. Therefore, using Claims 4.8, 4.11 and 4.12 we have
Pr[B] ≤ n · γ + n · γ + n · γ
2
≤ 3 · n · γ.
We know that conditioned on B, the attack of Construction 4.14 will be identical to the attack of Con-
struction 4.3 and increases the average to 1 − e
−(µ−2n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 − n · γ by Claim 4.5. Therefore, the attack of
Construction 4.14 can unconditionally increases the average to at least
1− e
−(µ−2n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 − n · γ − Pr[B] ≥ 1− e
−(µ−2n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 − 4n · γ.
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Now we state and prove another claim that bounds the expected number of tamperings performed by the
attack of Construction 4.14
Claim 4.16. For a tampering sequence v ← 〈u ‖EffTam〉, let Ti = C1(v≤i−1) ∨ C2(v≤i−1, ui) be the
event (or equivalently the Boolean function) denoting that a tampering choice is made by the adversary of
Construction 4.14 over the i’th block. If T =
∑n
i=1 Ti denotes the total number of tamperings, then
E[T] ≤ 1− µ+ n · γ
τ − 2γ + 3n
2 · γ.
Proof. Define event B similar to the proof of Claim 4.15. We know that conditioned on B, the attack of
Construction 4.14 will be identical to the attack of Construction 4.3 and uses average budget at most 1−µ+n·γτ−2γ
by Claim 4.6. Therefore, the attack of Construction 4.14 will use average budget atmost
1− µ+ n · γ
τ − 2γ + n · Pr[B] ≤
1− µ+ n · γ
τ − 2γ + 3n
2 · γ
Finally, we prove Theorem 3.1 by relying on the probabilistic guarantees of the estimators of the above
constructions for the approximate oracles.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let
k = ln
(
2
1− ρ
)
and τ =
µ
1.9
√
kn
and γ = min
{
µ
20n
,
µ
80
√
k · n,
1− ρ
8 · n ,
√
ln(2/(1 − ρ))
3n
√
n
}
.
Also, let EffTamτ,γ be the attack of Construction 4.14 instantiated with the parameters τ and γ specified
above. If v ≡ 〈un ‖EffTam〉, by Claim 4.15 we have
E[f(v)] ≥ 1− e
−(µ−2n·γ)2
2n·(τ+4γ)2 − 4n · γ
≥ 1− e
−(0.9µ)2
2n·(1.1τ)2 − 1− ρ
2
≥ 1− 1− ρ
2
− 1− ρ
2
= ρ.
On the other hand, By Claim 4.16 we have
E[T] ≤ 1− µ+ n · γ
τ − 2γ + 3n
2 · γ
≤ 1− 0.95µ
0.95τ
+
√
n · ln(2/(1 − ρ))
≤ 2− 1.9µ
µ
·
√
n · ln(2/(1 − ρ)) +
√
n · ln(2/(1 − ρ))
≤ 2
µ
·
√
n · ln(2/(1 − ρ)).
We also know that γ = ω(µ · (1− ρ)/n2). Therefore, by Claims 4.9 and 4.13 we conclude that the running
time of EffTamτ,γ is O(n
12 · ℓ/(µ · (1− ρ))5).
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5 Conclusion and Some Questions
In this work, we proved strong barriers against basing the robustness of learning algorithms in both settings
of evasion attacks (who aim at fining adversarial examples) and poisoning attacks (who try to increase
the misclassification probability by minimally tampering with the training data) on computational hardness
assumptions. Namely, we showed that a broad set of learning problems, and in particular classification
tasks whose instances are drawn from a product distribution of dimension n, are inherently vulnerable to
polynomial-time adversaries that find adversarial examples of (sublinear) Hamming distance O(
√
n) and
increase the classification error from 1% to 99%.
Our proofs are based on a new coin tossing attack that is inspired by the recent results of [KKR18].
Our coin tossing attacks could be interpreted as a polynomial-time algorithmic proof of the well-known
classical result of concentration measure in product distributions [AM80, MS86, McD89, Tal95]. While,
concentration of measure guarantees that for any initial large enough set S , “most” points in the probability
space are “close” to S , our algorithmic proof shows how to find such close instances in polynomial time.
Our work motivates studying the following natural questions.
Other computationally concentrated metric probability spaces (e.g., computational Le´vy families)?
Normal Le´vy families include numerous metric probability spaces in which the measure is concentrated.
Our Theorem 3.1 shows that product distributions, as a special form of normal Le´vy families are com-
putationally concentrated. How about other spaces (e.g., isotropic Gaussian distribution under Euclidean
distance) for which information theoretic concentration of measure is known? Proving any such results
about any other metric probability space, directly leads to polynomial-time attacks against evasion robust-
ness of any learning problem whose instances are drawn from those spaces. More generally, for what metric
probability spaces can we prove nontrivial computational concentration of measure. Namely, a space would
be computationally concentrated, if for any set S with “large enough” measure, “most” of the points in the
probability space can be efficiently mapped to “close” points in S . Here, “close” shall be something that
beats the trivial bound given by the diameter of the space. The latter question can be also interpreted as
proving (approximate) “computational isoperimetric” inequalities. Namely, here the “computational bound-
ary” of the set S would be defined by a computationally bounded mapping that efficiently maps the points
in “computational distance” b to S . As in Theorem 3.1, access to the underlying probability distribution and
membership in S can be provided by sampling and membership oracles.
Handling smaller initial error. Our Theorem 3.1 gives nontrivial attacks with sublinear o(n) perturba-
tion only if the initial average (or equivalently the probability of the target set S) is at least ω(log n/√n).
However, the information theoretic attacks of [MDM19] can handle original error that is only substantially
exp(−o(n)) large. What is the smallest probability µ for which we can obtain computational concentra-
tion of measure (for product or other distributions) if the target set has probability at least µ? Solving
this problem would have immediate impact on polynomial time evasion (and poisoning–in case of product
distributions) attacks that attack systems with smaller error (in the no-attack case).
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